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1. Introduction 
It is almost a common place in the economics of climate change that a good response to the 
challenges posed by global warming would be a harmonized, global tax on greenhouse gas 
emissions that increases over time roughly with the discount rate (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007). Many 
details of such proposal are hotly discussed, but one aspect receives relatively little questioning in 
the economic literature: should a carbon tax really be harmonized across the world, i.e. should the 
same tax rate on carbon emissions be enforced in all countries? 
The classical role of a Pigouvian tax on an economic activity that creates an externality is to 
correct the inefficiency associated with damages that are not reflected in market prices of goods. 
Traditionally distributional consequences are not dealt with at this stage, but rather it is assumed 
that other instruments can or will be used to “make up” for any unwanted distributional 
consequence caused by the correction of the externality. This is in the spirit of the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), i.e. that distributional issues ought to be separated from 
questions of economic efficiency. While there is a convincing argument that within one 
jurisdiction a government that could impose a tax on an externality does also have the necessary 
means (e.g. the income tax) to correct any undesirable distributional consequence caused by such 
a Pigouvian tax, this argument does not apply equally to cross-national cases of externalities or 
public goods. Climate change as a truly global public good is a classical example of that. 
An early discussion of this problem was provided in Chichilnisky and Heal (1994)
1
. They 
contrasted optimal marginal abatement costs of carbon emissions in a multi region setting when 
lump sum transfers are possible between different regions with a situation in which such transfers 
are ruled out. They found that in the latter optimal marginal abatement costs were different in 
each region, whereas with lump sum transfers the classical result of equated marginal abatement 
costs prevailed. They used a static model around a global public bad as an approximation to the 
climate change problem, but given the inherent dynamic nature of the climate problem, they 
mostly derived basic theoretical results that as such are hard to apply to concrete climate change 
policy questions. 
                                                     
1
 Sheeran (2006) provides an extended discussion of the same result. 
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Sandmo (2006) investigates the question of optimal Pigouvian taxes in relation to a global 
externality, again in a static utilitarian framework. He comes to a similar conclusion as Heal and 
Chichilnisky: Unless one assumes that lump sum transfers between regions are possible, optimal 
Pigouvian taxes on the externality producing activity should not be harmonized or equalized 
across countries, but rather poor countries should impose lower taxes than rich countries. 
The basic result that under certain welfare functions and an absence of lump sum transfers 
marginal abatement costs ought not to be equated has been discussed in a number of other papers 
as well. Most of these treatments stick to a static description of the problem, which makes their 
results not immediately applicable to a simulation of a stock externality problem like climate 
change with an integrated assessment model. Eyckmans et al. (1993) show not only that marginal 
abatement costs might differ between world regions in an optimum for specific welfare functions, 
but also discuss how various choices of welfare weights correspond to different results from 
negotiation processes. Shiell (2003b) acknowledges the basic result in Chichilnisky and Heal but 
argues that with a permit market the necessary lump sum transfers can always be obtained via the 
initial allocation of permits and that therefore differentiated marginal abatement costs could be 
avoided
2
. In this paper I look at a situation where this option is for whatever reason not possible. I 
will not give a stringent argument for this, but it seems at least plausible that large wealth 
transfers from rich to poor countries via initial allocation rules in a permit market might be 
politically infeasible. 
Other papers have dealt with equity in climate change abatement in broader terms. Tol (2001) 
and Tol (2002c) look at optimal emission abatement under a variety of different welfare 
functions. Böhringer and Helm (2008) look at equity with respect to abatement costs only.  
In this paper I build upon those results and extend them such that they can readily be employed 
for the analysis of climate change. On a theoretical level, I extend the analysis into a dynamic 
setting with a global stock externality, thus allowing an application to climate change. In doing so 
I also clarify how the discount rate is modified in an optimal setting that does not allow for lump 
sum transfers between regions. In a second step I then apply the integrated assessment model 
FUND to the problem and derive numerical estimates of optimal tax rates on carbon emissions, 
the corresponding optimal emission trajectory and optimal temperature targets. In a final step I do 
                                                     
2
 Shiell (2003a) uses a similar set up of welfare functions, dynamic optimization and regional disaggregation as used 
in this paper, but by assumption rules out differences in marginal abatement costs between regions, thereby focusing 
on a different question than I try to answer in this paper.  
4 
 
a sensitivity analysis of the results with respect to the key preference parameters of the pure rate 
of time preference and the inequality aversion. 
The rest of the paper is structured as following: In section 2, I present a theoretical model of 
optimal marginal abatement costs of a global public bad in a setting with and without lump sum 
transfers and derive key necessary conditions for an optimal emissions trajectory. In section 3 a 
brief description of the integrated assessment model FUND is given. Section 4 presents results 
and section 5 concludes.  
2. Theory 
Let 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟  be carbon emissions in year 𝑡 in region 𝑟. Total emissions in year 𝑡 are defined as 
𝑋𝑡 ≡  𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟𝑟 . Greenhouse gas concentrations 𝑆 in each year are characterised by a transition 
function 𝑔  
𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑔 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡 . (1) 
Concentrations depend on previous concentrations and current emissions from all regions. 
Per capita consumption 𝑐𝑡,𝑟  in year 𝑡 in region 𝑟 is 
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 =
𝐶𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑥𝑡,𝑟 − 𝐷𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡 
𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟
 (2) 
where 𝐶𝑡 ,𝑟  is total consumption, 𝐷𝑡 ,𝑟  is climate change damage and 𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟  is population. 
Consumption is assumed to depend on emissions, where we assume that 𝐶𝑡 ,𝑟 0 = 0, that there is 
an emissions level 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟  that maximizes consumption and that 𝐶𝑡 ,𝑟  is strictly concave. It follows 
that for all emission levels between 0 and 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟 , increasing emissions will increase consumption, 
i.e. 𝐶𝑡 ,𝑟
′  𝑥 > 0 for all 𝑥 ∈  0, 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟 . 𝐶 is calibrated such that the optimal emissions level 𝑥 and its 
corresponding income 𝐶 follow the business as usual scenario of the FUND model. 
Damage in period 𝑡 depends both on the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at that time. Due to 
the formulation of the transition function, 𝑆𝑡  only accounts for emissions in periods before 𝑡, but 
actual carbon concentrations at 𝑡 also depend on emissions in 𝑡. Therefore damage in period 𝑡 is a 
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function of both 𝑆𝑡  as well as 𝑋𝑡  concentrations , as well as on total emissions of all regions in the 
current period. 
Optimal emissions path 
The optimization problem of a global planner is given as 
max
 𝑥𝑡 𝑡=0
𝑇
 𝛿𝑡 𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟𝑈  𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝑟
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
s.t.   𝑆0 = 𝑆0 
(3) 
for a standard utilitarian welfare function, with 𝑆 0 being the carbon concentration at the start of the 
optimization period. 0 < 𝛿 < 1 is the per period discount factor. We also assume that the utility function 
𝑈 has the usual iso-elastic form: 
𝑈 𝑐 =  
ln 𝑐 for 𝜂 = 1
𝑐1−𝜂 1− 𝜂 for 𝜂 ≠ 1
 . (4) 
 
The Bellman equations
3
 for this problem are 
𝑉𝑡 𝑆𝑡 = max
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟  𝑟
 𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟𝑈  𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝑟
+ 𝛿𝑉𝑡+1 𝑆𝑡+1      ∀𝑡 (5) 
for each time 𝑡, with 𝑉𝑡(𝑆𝑡) as the value function for time 𝑡. The first order conditions for the 
maximization problem of the value function for year 𝑡 are 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖
  𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟𝑈  𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝑟
+ 𝛿𝑉𝑡+1 𝑆𝑡+1  = 0 ∀𝑖. (6) 
Using standard finite time horizon dynamic programming practice, we start deriving first order conditions 
at the end of the time horizon 𝑇, and then derive first order conditions for earlier time steps 𝑡 going back 
in time until we reach 𝑡 = 0. Given the complexities of the integrated assessment model used for this 
exercise, I do not derive an analytical solution for the value function, but rather find first order conditions 
that I can then use in a numerical search algorithm for the optimal emissions path. 
Let a marginal emission of carbon in year 𝑡 cause marginal damage 𝑀𝐷 in year 𝑠 and region 𝑟, i.e. 
                                                     
3
 The problem could of course also be solved by simply using Lagrange multiplier, given the finite time horizon of 
the model. A dynamic programming approach seems nevertheless easier and less convoluted. 
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𝑀𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑡 ≡
 
 
 
 
 𝜕𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 ,𝑋𝑠 
𝜕𝑋𝑠
for 𝑡 = 𝑠
𝜕𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 ,𝑋𝑠 
𝜕𝑆𝑠
for 𝑡 < 𝑠
  (7) 
 
With some manipulation we can rewrite the first order conditions as 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖
′  𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖 =  𝛿
𝑠−𝑡  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 
 
𝜂
       
𝑎
𝑀𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑡 
𝑟
𝑇
𝑠=𝑡
      ∀𝑖 (8) 
This is a variation of the familiar rule that marginal abatement costs should equal marginal damage costs, 
but with some important modifications. On the left hand side are marginal abatement costs for a specific 
region 𝑖 in year 𝑡. The right hand side of the equation is the weighted sum of marginal damages happening 
in every year after 𝑡 in all regions. There are two weights applied, first the pure time preference factor 
𝛿𝑠−𝑡 = 1  1 + 𝜌 𝑠−𝑡  with the pure rate of time preference 𝜌. The second weight after the summation sign 
over regions (part a) is a combination of distributional weights and the growth part in the standard Ramsey 
discount rate. Two different interpretations can help understand this second weight. 
To see the first we rewrite both weights for a specific region 𝑟 and time 𝑠 as  
 
𝛿𝑠−𝑡  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 
 
𝜂
       
𝑎
≈  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 
 
𝜂
       
𝑏
 
1
1 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝑔 𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 , 𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑠 − 𝑡 
 
𝑠−𝑡
                         
𝑐
 (9) 
Here 𝑔(𝑐1 , 𝑐2 , 𝑡) is defined as the average constant growth rate at which per capita consumption would 
grow from 𝑐1 to 𝑐2 over a time span of 𝑡 years.
4
 Part c is the standard Ramsey type discount factor for 
region 𝑟, based on per capita growth of the region where the damages occur. 
Part b is a distributional weight that is applied to the net present value of damage in a particular region. 
The distributional weight given to marginal damages occurring in the region for which we have marginal 
abatement costs in the equation will always be one, so that abatement and damages are valued equally and 
consistently (Anthoff et al., 2009). Marginal damages in other regions receive a distributional weight that 
                                                     
4
 𝑔 is defined by the equation 𝑐1 1 + 𝑔 𝑐1 , 𝑐2, 𝑡  
𝑡 = 𝑐2. 
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will be >1 (<1) for regions with lower (higher) per capita consumption than the regions for which 
abatement costs are calculated. 
To see the second interpretation we rewrite part a and the time discount factor as: 
𝛿𝑠−𝑡  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 
 
𝜂
       
𝑎
≈  
1
1 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝑔 𝑐𝑡 ,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡 , 𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑠 − 𝑡 
 
𝑠−𝑡
 (10) 
The expression on the right hand side of equation (10) is just the standard Ramsey type discount rate with 
a per capita growth rate that goes from the current level of the abating region to the per capita 
consumption of the region and the time where the marginal damage is occurring. Note that in principal 
this discount rate can be negative, when abatement costs are calculated for a region with a high current per 
capita income and damages that occur in a lower per capita region relative to that. 
We can now ask ourselves how optimal marginal abatement costs for different regions will look like. 
Another rearrangement of equation (8) gets us 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖
′  𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖 =  𝑐𝑡,𝑖 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝜂
     
𝑑
 𝛿𝑠−𝑡  𝑐𝑠,𝑟 𝑆𝑠 , 𝑥𝑠  
−𝜂
𝑀𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑡 
𝑟
𝑇
𝑠=𝑡
 (11) 
for marginal abatement costs in region 𝑖. Notice that except for part d all terms on the right hand side of 
the equation are the same for all regions. This allows for an easy interpretation: Optimal marginal 
abatement costs are higher for higher per capita consumption regions, and that effect is stronger for higher 
inequality parameters 𝜂, where higher inequality also increases the difference between the optimal 
marginal abatement costs of different regions. 
Efficient emissions path 
We now derive efficient abatement costs. Unlike the previous section, we ignore distributional questions 
between regions this time. The welfare economic rationale for such an approach would be the assumption 
that lump sum transfers are feasible and that any desirable distributional outcome can be achieved in a 
second step via such lossless transfers, after the externality has been internalized via a Pigouvian price 
signal – that is, the Coase (1960) Theorem holds. 
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Following the standard approach in the literature we replace our objective function with a new version that 
includes so called Negishi-weights  
max
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝜏𝑡 𝑡=0
𝑇
 𝛿𝑡 𝜆𝑡 ,𝑟𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟𝑈  𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝑟
𝑇
𝑡=0
 
s.t.   𝑆0 = 𝑆0 
(12) 
We calibrate the Negishi weights 𝜆 such that in our base case run marginal utility is equalized across all 
regions at each time step. In order to achieve this we follow the standard procedure (Nordhaus and Yang, 
1996; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and set 
𝜆𝑡 ,𝑟 =  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟
 𝐶𝑖,𝑟 𝑥𝑖 ,𝑟 𝑖  𝑃𝑡 ,𝑖𝑖 
 
𝜂
=  
𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟
𝑐𝑡
 
𝜂
 (13) 
where we define 𝑐𝑡  to be world average per capita consumption at time 𝑡. 
The new Bellman equations are 
𝑉𝑡 𝑆𝑡 = max
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑟  𝑟
 𝜆𝑡 ,𝑟𝑃𝑡 ,𝑟𝑈  𝑐𝑡 ,𝑟 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑥𝑡  
𝑟
+ 𝛿𝑉𝑡+1 𝑆𝑡+1  (14) 
The new first order conditions are, after some algebraic manipulation 
𝐶t,i
′ 𝑥t,i =  𝛿
𝑠−𝑡  
𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡 
𝑐𝑠 𝑆𝑠 ,𝑋𝑠 
 
𝜂
𝑀𝐷𝑠,𝑟 𝑡 
𝑟
T
s=t
    ∀𝑖 (15) 
for all time periods. Note that in this case in each time step marginal abatement costs are equal for all 
regions, given that the right hand side of equation (15) is the same for all regions. The weight given to the 
marginal damage term is reduced to the standard Ramsey discount factor 
𝛿𝑠−𝑡  
𝑐𝑡 𝑆𝑡 ,𝑋𝑡 
𝑐𝑠 𝑆𝑠 ,𝑋𝑠 
 
𝜂
=  
1
1 + 𝜌
 
𝑠−𝑡
 
1
1 + 𝜂𝑔𝑠
 
𝑠−𝑡
≈  
1
1 + 𝜌 + 𝜂𝑔𝑠
 
𝑠−𝑡
 (16) 
with 𝑔𝑠 being the annual growth rate of world average per capita consumption from time 𝑡 to 𝑠. 
3. The Model 
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) is an integrated 
assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and emissions to a simple 
carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and monetizing welfare impacts. 
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Climate change welfare impacts are monetarized in 1995 dollars and are modelled over 16 
regions. Modelled welfare impacts include agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and 
respiratory disorders influenced by cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, 
diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems (Link and Tol, 
2004). The source code, data, and a technical description of the model can be found at 
http://www.fund-model.org. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations.  The 
model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America, Canada, 
Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, South Asia, 
Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. Version 3.4, 
used in this paper, runs from 1950 to 3000 in time steps of one year. The primary reason for 
starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In FUND, the welfare impacts 
of climate change are assumed to depend in part on the impacts during the previous year, 
reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change.  Because the initial values to be used for 
the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical impacts and monetized welfare 
impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs. 
The 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 centuries are included to provide a proper long-term perspective. The 
remaining centuries are included to avoid endpoint problems for low discount rates, they have 
only a very minor impact on overall results.  
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the IMAGE 
100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994).  The period 1990-2000 is based on observations 
(http://earthtrends.wri.org).  The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past. The 
climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, 
which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992).   The period 2100-3000 
is extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous 
energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use (autonomous carbon 
efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon dioxide from land use change, 
methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions. 
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Emission reduction of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide is specified as in Tol (2006). 
Simple cost curves are used for the economic impact of abatement, with limited scope for 
endogenous technological progress and interregional spillovers (Tol, 2005). 
The scenarios of economic growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic change.
5
  Climate-
induced migration between the regions of the world causes the population sizes to change.  
Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host 
population. 
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy.  Consumption and 
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate.  As a result, climate change reduces 
long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term.  
Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures.  The energy intensity of 
the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time.  
This process can be accelerated by abatement policies. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon dioxide emission 
reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the damages on the economy 
caused by climate change.  Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then 
geometrically depleted.  The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per 
million by volume, is represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann 
(1987).  Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992).  
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990).  The global mean temperature, T, is governed by a 
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF), with a half-life of 
50 years.  In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a 
doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents.  Regional temperature is derived by multiplying the 
global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change 
pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000).  The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years.  
                                                     
5
 Note that in the standard version of FUND population growth is also perturbed by climate change impacts. That 
particular feature was switched off in the runs for this paper because endogenous population changes cannot be 
evaluated with the kind of welfare function investigated. 
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Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and sea 
level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to 
cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, 
water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related damages are triggered by 
either the rate of temperature change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of temperature 
change (benchmarked at 1.0°C).  Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, 
reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, 
or they can migrate because of sea level rise.  Like all welfare impacts of climate change, these 
effects are monetized.  The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita 
income.
6
  The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of values 
in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992).  The value of emigration is set to be three times the per capita 
income (Tol, 1995; 1996), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the 
host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled 
explicitly.  The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 
million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994).  Dryland value is assumed to be 
proportional to GDP per square kilometre.  Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square 
kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994).  The wetland value is 
assumed to have a logistic relation to per capita income.  Coastal protection is based on cost-
benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, energy, water, and 
ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts 
measured in their „natural‟ units (cf. Tol, 2002a).  Modelled effects of climate change on energy 
consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that 
there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant 
physiology and the behaviour of farmers.  Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether 
                                                     
6
 Note that this implies that the monetary value of health risk is effectively discounted with the pure rate of time 
preference rather than with the consumption rate of discount (Horowitz, 2002). It also implies that, after equity 
weighing, the value of a statistical life is equal across the world (Fankhauser et al., 1997). 
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the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate.  Impacts 
are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away from the optimum climate.  The 
optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts.  The actual impacts lag 
behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation.  The impacts of not being 
fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, hurricanes, unmanaged 
ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled 
as simple power functions.  Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign 
(cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress.  Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water 
resources (with population growth) and heat-related disorders (with urbanization), or more 
valuable, such as ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes).  Other systems are 
projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved health 
care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
4. Results 
In this section I will present results for an optimal tax scheme in which lump sum transfers 
between regions are assumed to be possible and one where there are no transfers. These 
correspond to the two welfare functions presented in section 2. After presenting some results for 
key indicators like tax rates, emission rates and temperature development, I will present 
sensitivity analysis for a number of key parameters. 
Central results 
Figure 1 contrasts tax rates for the different regions of FUND in the year 2005 for a specific 
calibration of the utility function (pure rate of time preference of 1% and η of 1). In the case 
without the possibility of transfer payments, optimal tax rates (or marginal abatement costs) are 
equal in all regions at $23/tC
7
. When transfer or compensation payments are ruled out, tax rates 
                                                     
7
 All results are in 1995 USD. 
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differ greatly between regions, with optimal tax rates for rich regions (ANZ, CAN, WEU, USA 
and JPK) increasing up to $179 for Japan, while the tax rate decreases in all other regions, to 
below $2 for very poor regions like sub Saharan Africa. China‟s optimal tax is almost reduced by 
50% to $12. 
As income differences between regions change over time, so does the spread of tax rates between 
different regions. Figure 2 shows optimal tax rates for a few selected regions in the year 2050 and 
2100 for the same utility function calibration as previous. For the scenario with lump sum 
transfers the optimal tax increases to $60 in the year 2050 and $148 in the year 2100 for all 
regions. The assumed rapid economic growth of China in the scenario makes for a dramatic 
adjustment of its optimal tax rate over time: In the year 2050 the tax without transfers payments 
is just 15% below the global tax rate in a scenario with lump sum transfers (compared to 50% in 
the year 2005), and in the year 2100 China would actually have a higher tax on carbon emissions 
in a scenario without transfers compared to one with. 
Figure 3 demonstrates what these tax rates imply in terms of emissions reductions per region. The 
graph shows the reduction of emissions in percent in the year 2050 for each region compared to 
its emissions in a business as usual scenario.
8
 In the scenario with lump sum transfers the 
question in which regions reductions occur is only determined by the cost of emission reductions, 
i.e. regions with a lot of low cost mitigation opportunities will show large reductions in emissions 
while regions with only costly mitigation options will reduce less. In regions such as the former 
Soviet Union, where mitigation can be achieved at low cost, the assumption of no lump sum 
transfers leads to a situation where those low cost abatement opportunities are not picked up, 
given that they would be paid for by the relatively low income population of that region. On the 
other hand, rich regions will mitigate a lot more, although it is costly, given that in the utilitarian 
welfare calculus those high costs do get less weight when they occur to the relatively wealthy 
population of the United States. 
While the differences between regions vary greatly between a scenario with lump sum transfers 
and one in which this is ruled out, the total emission reduction stays almost the same at around 
19%. While the difference is small, the assumption that no compensation will take place actually 
leads to a lower total optimal worldwide reduction in emissions. This is a somewhat surprising 
result, previously there was a sense that taking equity between regions explicitly into account in 
                                                     
8
 In particular these are not reductions compared to a historic base line point (like 1990 or today). 
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climate change policy would lead to more stringent mitigation policies. As the results in this 
paper show, at least under one widely used ethical framework, utilitarianism, this need not be the 
case. Inequality aversion and a concern for equity will in general give more weight to both 
impacts and mitigation costs in poor regions than in high income regions. The poor are especially 
vulnerable to climate change impacts and it has been shown repeatedly that when one only looks 
into impacts of climate change, a concern for equity increases damage estimates (c.f. Fankhauser 
et al., 1997; Pearce, 2003; Tol et al., 2003; Anthoff et al., 2009), from which one might conclude 
that more mitigation would be justified under such an approach. The analysis in this paper on the 
other hand also gives higher weight to mitigation costs in poor regions. If a lot of cheap 
mitigation options are located in poor regions, such a treatment will have the effect that lower 
mitigation is appropriate when a concern for equity is present. As the results in this paper show, 
the latter effect dominates and overall mitigation is lower with a concern for equity.   
Sensitivity analysis 
Do these findings vary for different calibrations of the welfare function, in particular for different 
choices for the pure rate of time preference and inequality aversion? Table 1 shows the resulting 
temperature increase above pre-industrial temperatures in °C in the year 2100 for the business as 
usual scenario and contrasts it with the temperature increase that would result if one would 
choose the optimal mitigation path for various calibrations of the utility function. 
The first general result is that for a high pure rate of time preference of 3% there is hardly any 
difference in the optimal temperature target in the year 2100 over both different preference 
parameters and scenarios with and without transfer payments, while even the difference between 
a business as usual scenario and optimal policy scenarios is small. Note also that some of the 
combinations should not be taken too serious, in particular one would not want to combine a high 
pure rate of time preference with a high inequality aversion, given that this would lead to real 
interest rates that are above the observed market rate, unless total factor productivity growth has 
been overestimated (cf. Nordhaus, 2008 for a careful discussion).  
A second general conclusion is that for higher choices of inequality aversion, in general less 
stringent temperature targets are optimal.
9
 While this result would not be surprising if inequalities 
between regions were neglected (in which case higher inequality versions would simply increase 
                                                     
9
 With one minor exception, but that is so small that it seems not important. 
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the discount rate), it does not follow analytically for a setup as used in this paper, where higher 
inequality aversion between regions might have led to a different result. As such the findings in 
this paper support the conclusion that while higher inequality aversion might alter the distribution 
of mitigation efforts between regions, overall it will not lead to more stringent optimal global 
mitigation targets. 
When comparing a transfer with a no transfer scenario, the results for different utility function 
calibrations is more nuanced. While for an inequality aversion of 1, the optimal temperature 
target is always less stringent if one assumes that no transfers are possible, this result reverses for 
higher inequality aversion choices. While higher inequality values have been suggested as 
reasonable for purely intertemporal decisions (Dasgupta, 2008), they would further widen the gap 
between actually wealth transfers between rich and poor regions and what the optimal wealth 
transfer according to the welfare function would be (Okun, 1975). The difficulty of using one 
parameter to both specify inter- as well as intra-temporal inequality aversion (and in non-
deterministic models risk aversion as well) has been recognised in the literature, but not yet been 
resolved (Saelen et al., 2008). 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I contrast a first-best world in which an optimal emissions path is calculated purely 
based on an efficiency criterion, i.e. under the assumption that any distributional consequences of 
a specific policy can be dealt with at a later stage with different (and costless) instruments, with a 
look at a specific ethical framework and a global decision maker that is constraint in its policy 
options. In particular, I assumed in a second step that a global decision maker has the ability to 
set mitigation paths for all regions, but does not have any instruments at hand to compensate for 
unwanted distributional disturbances caused by the emission control policy. In this second 
scenario I looked at a specific welfare function, namely a classical utilitarian one, and derived 
optimal emission reduction pathways for different regions. 
The results show that the two cases have dramatically different emission reductions targets per 
region, but at the same time the overall global optimal emission path is affected a lot less by these 
considerations. In particular, taking account of equity between regions as I did in this paper does 
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not change the optimal global emission path in a dramatic way from the emission path that is 
calculated when only taking efficiency into consideration. 
At the same time the approach in this paper has severe limitations. First, it only takes too 
extremes into account: Either all transfers between regions are ruled out or they are assumed to 
have no limits as pure lump sum transfers. These two choices clearly constitute the boundaries of 
the problem, in reality one can imagine much more nuanced frameworks, with partial 
compensation payments between regions, payments that are not lossless and transfers only 
between specific regions. 
Secondly, I base the analysis of the situation without transfers on a utilitarian welfare function, 
without any philosophical justification for it. There is no good reason for this other than this is 
common practise in most of the literature on the economics of climate change. Once one leaves 
the world of pure efficiency, the question of which ethical framework to pick becomes of high 
importance. In this paper I do not argue that the specific utilitarian welfare function I used is the 
appropriate one, I only show that under that specific choice distributional questions are of 
significant importance to the optimal marginal abatement costs. 
Finally, this paper ignores any problems of incentives of different regions, i.e. the game theoretic 
problem of reaching an actual agreement to mitigate climate change emissions is ignored. At the 
same time I see a contribution of this paper to that literature: in any attempt to come up with 
some global agreement that circumvents the free-riding problem associated with a global public 
bad like climate change there is a need for a benchmark optimal solution. What is the optimum 
that should be achieved by a achieved by an international agreement? This is principally a 
normative question, and I hope this paper demonstrates that purely looking at an efficient 
outcome might not do the magnitude of the distributional problem justice. 
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Figure 1: Optimal tax per tC in the year 2005 for prtp=1% and η=1 
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Figure 2: Optimal tax per tC for selected regions in the year 2050 and 2100 for prtp=1% and η=1 
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Figure 3: Reduction in emissions compared to business as usual scenario in the year 2050 for prtp=1% and η=1 
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Tables 
 
Business as usual warming: 3.17 
   
Utility calibration No transfers Transfers 
η=1   
prtp=0.1% 2.41 2.34 
prtp=1.0% 2.92 2.91 
prtp=3.0% 3.12 3.12 
η=1.5   
prtp=0.1% 2.65 2.75 
prtp=1.0% 2.96 3.03 
prtp=3.0% 3.13 3.13 
η=2   
prtp=0.1% 2.69 2.98 
prtp=1.0% 2.95 3.09 
prtp=3.0% 3.13 3.14 
Table 1: Temperature increase above pre-industrial in °C in the year 2100 for no policy intervention (business as usual) 
and optimal policies for different calibrations of the utility function 
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